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Becoming a rich country requires the ability to produce and export commodities that 
embody certain characteristics. We classify 779 exported commodities according to two 
dimensions: (1) sophistication (measured by the income content of the products 
exported); and (2) connectivity to other products (a well-connected export basket is one 
that allows an easy jump to other potential exports). We identify 352 “good” products 
and 427 “bad” products. Based on this, we categorize 154 countries into four groups 
according to these two characteristics. There are 34 countries whose export basket 
contains a significant share of good products. We find 28 countries in a “middle product” 
trap. These are countries whose export baskets contain a significant share of products that 
are in the middle of the sophistication and connectivity spectra. We also find 17 countries 
that are in a “middle-low” product trap, and 75 countries that are in a difficult and 
precarious “low product” trap. These are countries whose export baskets contain a 
significant share of unsophisticated products that are poorly connected to other products. 
To escape this situation, these countries need to implement policies that would help them 
accumulate the capabilities needed to manufacture and export more sophisticated and 
better connected products. 
 
Keywords: Bad Product; Capabilities; “Low Product” Trap; “Middle Product” Trap; 
Proximity; Sophistication; Structural Transformation 
 










The study of the reasons why some countries achieve sustained growth that allows them 
to develop while many others cannot do it and seem not to be able to progress has been at 
the core of economics since the days of the founding fathers of the discipline (i.e., Smith, 
Ricardo, Malthus, and their critic, Marx), whose concern was the study of the 
determinants of the wealth of nations. Later on, after WWII, with the birth of 
development economics as a field, this has been, and continues to be, the central question 
of the discipline. In the words of Lucas (1988): “The consequences for human welfare 
involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about 
them, it is hard to think about anything else” (Lucas 1988: 5).
1 
Explaining why most countries in the world are in some sort of economic trap is 
not easy. Standard growth models like the Harrod (1939), Domar (1946), Solow (1956), 
or the myriad of endogenous growth models developed since the 1980s (see Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin [1995] or Aghion and Howitt [1998] for expositions) somehow address the 
question of why some countries achieve sustained growth while some others cannot do it, 
but they were not conceived with the objective of explaining differences between 
developed and developing countries, and much less explaining why so many countries in 
the world are trapped.  
Arthur Lewis (1955: 208) argued that the central fact of economic development is 
rapid capital accumulation. Development requires increasing the annual rate of net 
investment from 5 percent or less to 12 percent or more. “This is what we mean by an 
Industrial Revolution.” The evidence of the last fifty five years seems to indicate that 
while investment does matter for growth and development, developing takes much more 
than increasing the rate of investment to at least 12 percent. 
The reality is that the world has been divided for quite some time among three 
groups: (i) the club of rich nations, with income per capita above $12,000, according to 
                                                 
1 The questions Lucas refers to are in the previous sentence of his paper: “Is there some action a 
Government of India could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If 
so, what exactly? If not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so?” (Lucas 1988: 5).  
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the World Bank, using 2007 data; (ii) a very large group of poor countries with income 
per capita below $1,000; and (iii) a group of countries that falls in between these two. 
These countries seem to move forward, but slowly, with the consequence that very few 
graduate and make it to the club of rich countries. Some of these nations are Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, Malaysia, or Thailand. They are referred to as being in a “middle 
income trap.” However, most countries in the world have not even reached this stage. Is it 
because the rate of investment is below 12 percent? No, today we know that their 
problem is much more complex.
 2 
In this paper, we attempt to provide empirical content to the traps that many 
countries face in order to develop. To this purpose, we study the characteristics of their 
export basket. We classify 154 countries according to two dimensions of an export basket 
comprising 779 products: (i) sophistication (measured by the income content); and (ii) 
connectivity to other products (a well-connected export basket is one that allows an easy 
jump to other potential exports). There are only 34 countries in the world that export 
mostly sophisticated and well-connected products. We identify 28 countries in the world 
that are in a “middle product trap,” 17 countries that are in a “middle-low” product trap, 
and 75 countries that are in a difficult and precarious “low product trap.” To solve this 
fundamental development problem requires, first, an understanding of the relationship 
between poverty and the structure of production, i.e., what countries produce and export 
determines who they are in the world; and second, implementation of appropriate and 
realistic economic policies. Specifically, we argue that what allows countries to become 
rich has to do with the type of economic activities they engage in (i.e., the type of goods 
they end up producing and exporting), and with the policies that they implement to 
promote and develop certain types of industries. 
                                                 
2 The role of investment in development is neither well understood nor even agreed upon by economists. 
While the proposition that investment is key for growth seems obvious, the empirical evidence is not 
conclusive. For example, Easterly (2002: 39–42) and Oulton and O’Mahony (1994) claim that capital does 
not play any special role;
  while Prichett (2003: 217–21) claims that “except for the causality issue, the role 
of physical investment in growth is well understood.” On the issue of causality, Blomstrom, Lipsey, and 
Zejan (1996) used causality tests and found that a faster rate of GDP growth causes a higher investment-
output ratio and not vice versa. If this is true, the implication is that investment is not a key determining 
exogenous variable in the growth process. Once growth is underway, the resulting profits will cause the 
investment rate to increase in a Keynesian fashion. As Kaldor (1970) pointed out, Henry Ford did not build 
up his automobile business from high initial savings, but from the profits his factory generated.  
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There are three strands of the development literature that are extremely relevant if 
one wants to explain why some countries make it while many others do not. They run 
parallel and complement each other. First, there are models that specifically deal with the 
question of why some countries get into “traps” that do not allow them to maintain 
sustained growth. Perhaps the oldest trap model, at least formalized in mathematical 
terms, is Nelson’s (1956) low-level poverty trap, which intends to integrate population 
and development theory by recognizing the interdependence between population growth, 
per capita income, and national income growth.
3 This model demonstrates the difficulties 
that developing countries face in achieving a self-sustained rise in living standards. The 
low-level equilibrium trap refers to a situation where per capita income is permanently 
depressed as a consequence of a fast population growth, faster than the growth in national 
income. In dynamic terms, as long as this happens, per capita income is forced down to 
the subsistence level. Myrdal’s (1957) model of “cumulative causation” is also part of the 
same tradition. Myrdal argued that economic and social forces produce tendencies toward 
disequilibrium, which tends to persist and even widen over time. Myrdal argued, for 
example, that following an exogenous shock that generates disequilibrium between two 
regions, a multiplier-accelerator mechanism produces increasing returns in the favored 
region such that the initial difference, instead of closing as a result of factor mobility, 
remains and even increases.
4 
Second, since the early days of development economics, it was recognized that 
development is about the transformation of the productive structure and the accumulation 
of the capabilities necessary to undertake this process. The structural transformation 
                                                 
3 The idea of traps was also present in the writings of the classical authors, who argued that, in the long run, 
the supply curve of labor was horizontal at the subsistence wage, i.e., the level of the real wage at which 
birth and death rates equalize. This rate is just high enough to reproduce the population and labor force 
without change. Malthus assumed that the labor supply would be closely related to population, so that a 
constant population would also mean a constant labor supply. In this model, if the wage rate were to rise 
above subsistence, the population would grow, and the increased supply of labor would tend to force the 
wage downward. If the wage rate were to fall below subsistence, high infant mortality would lead the 
population to shrink, and the resulting decline in the supply of labor would tend to force the wage upward. 
Over a period of time long enough to allow for these changes in population, the wage in this model will 
tend to remain close to the subsistence level. 
4 Myrdal also argued that, through trade, the developing countries have been forced into the production of 
goods with inelastic demand with respect to both price and income.  
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literature argues that economic development is a process in which new activities emerge, 
old ones disappear, and the weight of all economic activities and their patterns of 
interaction change. This is closely related to the notion of structural change—the growing 
importance of non-agricultural sectors in production and employment. This is the 
tradition of Kuznets (1966), Kaldor (1967), or Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986), 
among others. Specifically, structural change shows up in changes in the shares of labor 
of the different sectors, typically with a decline in that of agriculture and an increase in 
those of the nonagricultural sectors. For many years, development was equated with 
industrialization. The importance of manufacturing derives from its potential for strong 
productivity growth and the high income elasticity of demand for manufactures. As labor 
and capital move into these activities, average productivity in the economy increases. 
Today, it is believed that some services, based on new technologies and standardization 
of delivery, enable substantial productivity gains in some activities (Felipe et al. 2009). 
Examples of these sectors are transport services, financial operations, wholesale trade, 
and renting services. 
The countries that have succeeded in this process are those that have managed to 
change the productive structure of the economy, and have been able to produce and 
export a more diversified and sophisticated product basket. This is the recent experience 
of some countries in Asia, e.g., Korea and Singapore. China is undergoing a deep process 
of structural transformation that, to a large extent, explains its rapid growth. On the other 
hand, the countries that have failed are those that are not able to engineer this process. 
They get stuck in the production and export of a relatively narrow range of goods that are 
often unsophisticated.  
The recent work of Hidalgo et al. (2007) is a novel contribution to the structural 
transformation literature. These authors introduce the product space, an application of 
network theory that yields a graphical representation of all products exported in the 
world. Products are linked through lines that represent their proximity, defined as the 
conditional probability of exporting one product given that they also export the other one. 
Using the product space, Hausmann and Klinger (2007) argue that countries 
change their export mix by jumping to products that are nearby, in the sense that these  
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other products use similar capabilities to those used by the products in which they excel 
(i.e., those products in which they have revealed comparative advantage [RCA]). 
According to this capabilities approach, comparative advantage depends more on the 
nation’s ability (i.e., capability) to understand, master, and use technologies than on 
factor endowments (see also Lall 1992, 2000a, and 2000b).          
Third is the literature on capabilities à la Sutton (2001, 2005). Becoming a rich 
country is about being able to earn higher real wages. In the same vein as Hidalgo et al. 
(2007), Sutton argues that some economic activities are more lucrative than others. 
Countries that specialize in such activities enjoy a higher level of real wages. But unlike 
the traditional neoclassical model, where higher real wages are the result of an increasing 
capital-labor ratio, Sutton argues that the primary driver of growth is the gradual build-up 
of firms’ capabilities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of 
capabilities in the context of the product space and a country’s growth prospects. Section 
3 discusses the methodology and the various concepts used to classify products as well as 
countries. We define and identify “bad” products. These are products that have low 
sophistication and/or are not well-connected to other products. Based on this, we identify 
countries that are in the “low” and “middle” product traps. Our results indicate that many 
countries in the world (in fact, most of them) export bad products, i.e., the largest number 
of commodities exported with RCA fall into these groups. On the other hand, there are 
other countries that export some of all kinds of products, i.e., both “good” and “bad” 
products. Having capabilities to excel in products that are not bad gives these countries 
an opportunity to switch to other more sophisticated and better connected products. 
Specifically, we identify three groups of countries (comprising a total of 120 countries) 
that fall into the “low” or “middle product” trap, plus one group of 34 countries that 
produce “good” products, i.e., sophisticated and well-connected. Section 4 provides some 






2. PRODUCT TRAPS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
A key challenge that most countries in the world face is how to upgrade and diversify 
their export basket. Many countries have been able to exploit their low-wage advantage 
to attract foreign direct investment into many industries. However, the challenges to 
deepen industrial capabilities, upgrade the skills of the local labor force, set up and build 
innovation, research, and development capacity in the domestic economy, and move to 
high-value added and more sophisticated products are significant.
5 Why upgrade and 
diversify? In recent research, Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 
(2007) recognize the central role that structural transformation plays in development. 
Specifically, they argue that while growth and development are the result of structural 
transformation, not all activities have the same consequences for a country’s growth 
prospects. The implication is that a sustainable growth trajectory must involve the 
introduction of new goods and not merely involve continual learning on a fixed set of 
goods. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) show that, after controlling for other 
factors such as initial per capita income, countries with a more sophisticated export 
basket grow faster. In other words, what a country exports does matter for subsequent 
growth. De Ferranti et al. (2000) show that export diversification is associated with a 
higher GDP growth. 
Standard trade theory postulates that the main determinant of a country’s 
comparative advantage, and therefore its trade pattern, is the relative factor endowment. 
Changes in a country’s export basket are a result of the changing comparative advantage 
based on factor accumulation. The idea is to get the prices right for the various factors of 
production so that firms select the appropriate techniques of production. Factor 
accumulation leads to factor price changes, which induce changes in the technique of 
production. Countries grow by way of accumulating physical or human capital or by 
improving the way various factors of production are mixed (total factor productivity). 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Malaysia’s New Economic Model (National Economic Advisory Council: 
http://www.neac.gov.my/content/download-option-new-economic-model-malaysia-2010), which stresses 
the need to upgrade from assembly to product development. Most developing countries have similar plans.  
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This brings about a change in the composition of the export basket. Thus, structural 
transformation is the result of changes in underlying fundamentals such as education, 
financial resources, and overall productivity. 
However, export diversification and upgrading are not easy. This is because 
venturing into a new activity entails a significant amount of uncertainty about the 
profitability of the new venture. The first entrant into this new activity has to engage in 
some sort of “cost discovery” (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). The new activity may have 
high social returns but the costs are all private. This is because if the venture fails, all the 
costs are borne by the entrant. However, if the venture succeeds, others on the margin 
will be quick to enter the activity.  
Another possible reason why export diversification is not easy is that many new 
activities may require other large-scale investments that are critical to the profitability of 
the new activity itself. For example, agroprocessing industries may require well-
developed cold storage transportation systems, logistics and transport networks, well-
established regulatory bodies to provide phytosanitary clearances and permits, and 
marketing of a country abroad as a reputable source of agro-based products. All these 
complementary activities involving high fixed costs are unlikely to be provided by the 
private sector, or are unlikely to be developed by the firms themselves, given the public-
good nature of many such services. As a result, the new activity may not find any takers. 
In other words, there is a coordination failure. As a result, the new activity may fail to 
develop.  
Export diversification and upgrading involves venturing into new activities, which 
may involve information and coordination externalities. In some activities and in some 
countries there may be a long learning phase with a considerable amount of risk and 
uncertainty. In other activities and countries the learning phase might be shorter. The 
extent of policy response will therefore vary. 
Hausmann and Klinger (2007) investigate the process by which countries are able 
to diversify their export mix. They argue that countries change their export mix by 
moving to products “nearby” to the products in which they already excel (i.e., those 
products that they export with RCA). This is based on the idea that each product requires  
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a specific set of capabilities, and if a country has RCA in that product, then that country 
has accumulated the product-specific capabilities. What are these capabilities? They are: 
(i) human and physical capital, the legal system, institutions, etc. that are needed to 
produce a product (hence, they are product-specific, not just a set of amorphous factor 
inputs); (ii) at the firm level, they are the “know-how” and working practices held 
collectively by the group of individuals comprising the firm; and (iii) the organizational 
abilities that provide the capacity to form, manage, and operate activities that involve 
large numbers of people. According to Sutton (2001, 2005), capabilities manifest 
themselves as a quality-productivity combination. A given capability is embodied in the 
tacit knowledge of the individuals who comprise the firm’s workforce. The quality-
productivity combinations are not a continuum from zero; rather, there is a window with 
a “minimum threshold” below which the firm would be excluded from the market. 
Therefore, capabilities are largely nontradable inputs. 
A country’s ability to foray into new products depends on whether the set of 
existing capabilities can be easily redeployed for the production and export of new 
products. This idea implies that it is probably easier for a country that exports T-shirts, 
for example, to add shorts rather than smart phones to its export basket. On the other 
hand, it is very likely that a country that exports basic cell phones has the capabilities to 
add smart phones to its export basket. The implication is that it is easier to start producing 
a “nearby” product (in terms of required capabilities to export it successfully) than a 
product that is “far away” and requires capabilities that the country probably does not 
possess.  
Hidalgo et al. (2007) conceptualize these ideas in the newly developed product 
space. The rationale behind the product space is that if two goods need similar 
capabilities, a country should show a high probability of exporting both with comparative 
advantage. Thus, the barriers preventing entry into new products are less binding for 
products that use similar capabilities. 
The product space is highly heterogeneous. Some products are close-by to others 
(because they require similar capabilities), while some others are in a sparse area of the 
product space. In the first case, it easy to jump from one product into another one (and  
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therefore export the new one with comparative advantage), while in the second case, it is 
difficult. The core of the product space, the area with many products close by, comprises 
chemicals, machinery, and metal products. The periphery consists of petroleum, raw 
materials, tropical agriculture, animal products, cereals, labor-intensive goods, and 
capital-intensive goods (excluding metal products). Core products also tend to be more 
sophisticated than those in the periphery. 
The heterogeneous structure of the product space has important implications for 
structural change. If a country exports goods located in a dense part of the product space, 
then expanding to other products is much easier because the set of already acquired 
capabilities can be easily redeployed for the production of other nearby products. This is 
likely to be the case of different types of machinery or of electronic goods. However, if a 
country specializes in the peripheral products, this redeployment is more challenging as 
no other set of products requires similar capabilities. This is the case of natural resources 
such as oil.  
A country’s position within the product space, therefore, signals its capacity to 
expand to more sophisticated products, thereby laying the groundwork for future growth. 
Countries that export products that have few linkages with other products (i.e., countries 
that have accumulated capabilities that are hard to redeploy) or countries that have not 
accumulated sufficient capabilities to jump to other products cannot generate sustained 
long-term growth. 
We use a country’s position in the product space to classify it according to two 
product characteristics, sophistication (PRODY) and connectivity to other products 
(PATH). This, in turn, informs us on the extent of policy interventions that might be 
required to get these countries out of “unsophisticated” and “unconnected” products so 










As argued above, accumulated capabilities are critical for a country’s development 
prospects. Under the capabilities approach, the shift of a country’s output and 
employment structure away from low value-added activities into high value-added 
activities might not be an easy task because venturing into new activities is dependent on 
the capabilities already accumulated, i.e., the process is path dependent. This is not to say 
that output and employment structures are rigid and cannot be changed. What it means is 
that the accumulation of new capabilities, and therefore the ability to venture into new 
products, is the result of a long and a cumulative process, one that involves a mix of 
learning, building institutional capacity, and an appropriate business environment (Lall 
2000a; Hausmann and Klinger 2006; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2007; Hidalgo et al. 
2007). Accumulating and developing capabilities may require specific and targeted 
government policy interventions. 
Using a twofold criteria, we classify countries and examine the kind and the 
degree of policy interventions that they would need to implement in order to accumulate 
the capabilities that would allow them to bring about a significant change in their output 
and employment structure, i.e., induce faster structural process. Our discussion in the 
previous section has highlighted the role of the kind of products that a country exports 
with RCA. To this end, we classify products based on two characteristics: (i) product 
sophistication and (ii) path.  
 
3.1 Product Classification 
Following Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), we calculate the sophistication level of 
a product as the weighted average of the GDP per capita of the countries exporting that 
product.
6 Algebraically: 
                                                 
6 Lall, Weiss, and Zhang (2006) also develop a similar measure of product sophistication. Their measure is 
a weighted average of the mean income of ten groups of countries (countries are divided into ten groups 
according to income) and the weights are the share of the ten groups in the world exports of a product. 
While not exactly the same as that of Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), the two measures rely on 
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where xvalci is the value of country c’s export of commodity i and GDPpcc is country c’s 
per capita GDP. We calculate PRODY for 779 products using highly disaggregated trade 
data (SITC-Rev.2 4-digit level, UNCOMTRADE Database) for 2003–07, and use the 
average of the five years. GDP per capita (measured in 2005 PPP$) is from the World 
Development Indicators. PRODY is measured in 2005 PPP$. It varies from a low of 
$1,182 for “fabrics, woven of jute or other textile bast fibers of heading 2640” to a high 
of $35,885 for “halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbons.” 
  The rationale that underlies PRODY is that, absent any trade interventions, high-
income countries are able to export despite higher wages because of the characteristics of 
the products. One such characteristic is the level of technology embedded in their 
products. However, this is not the only reason. Other reasons why activities are located in 
high per capita income countries include the availability of natural resources, the quality 
of infrastructure, intellectual property rights, the degree of divisibility of the production 
process, transportation costs, and possibilities of knowledge spillovers from 
agglomeration, especially in the case of research- and development-intensive activities.
7 
Thus, PRODY, not only reflects technological sophistication, but also incorporates these 
other factors. 
                                                 
7 The location of activities, especially in recent times with the advancements in supply-chain management, 
logistics, and information technology, could also be a reflection of the extent to which production processes 
can be fragmented and located in different places to take advantage of low labor costs. Lall, Albaladejo, 
and Zhang (2004) note that industries with discrete production processes see greater fragmentation 
compared to those with continuous production processes. They further note that within the former, products 
with high value-to-weight ratios and some processes with high labor intensity and relatively simple skill 
needs are easier to fragment. Thus, production processes in some industries such as electronics are highly 
divisible, less so in the case of automotive industry, and least in the case of aerospace industry.  
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The second criterion segregates products according to how easily the capabilities 
that they embody can be redeployed and used to export other products. Recall that we 
have argued that development is a path-dependent process, and whether or not a country 
is able to venture into new activities is determined by the existing set of capabilities. In 
simple terms, we want to know whether the capabilities that allow a country to export 
basic mobile phones, for example, can be redeployed to export another product, for 
example smart phones or luxury cars.  
Hidalgo et al. (2007) introduce the notion of “proximity.” It is a measure of 
whether a country that exports a product will be able to export another one. Proximity 
between two products i and j, denoted  ij ϕ , is the minimum of the pairwise conditional 
probabilities that a country exports a good given that it exports another one. 
Algebraically: 
 
() ( ) { } ij i j j i P RCA RCA P RCA RCA min | , | ϕ = ,   0≤φij≤1  (2) 
 
where, () ij PR C A R C A | is the conditional probability that a country exports good i with 
RCA (RCAi) given that it already exports good j also with RCA (RCAj).
8 Since the 
measure of proximity involves using the minimum of the pairwise conditional 
probabilities, the matrix of conditional probabilities is symmetric.  
We use Balassa’s (1965) measure of RCA. It is the ratio of the export share of a 
product in the country’s export basket to the same share at a worldwide level. 
Algebraically:  
 
                                                 
8 The conditional probability that a country exports good i with RCA given that it exports good j also with 
RCA is calculated as the ratio of the number of countries that export both goods i and j with RCA to the 
number of countries that export good j with RCA. Then we choose the smaller of the two conditional 
probabilities, which implies (given that they only differ in the denominator) that we choose the one whose 
denominator is larger, i.e., the more ubiquitous product. Given that we have 779 products, we calculate a 



















RCA      ( 3 )  
 
where xvalci is the value of country c’s export of commodity i.
 9 For purposes of our 
analysis, country c exports product i with RCA if RCAci>1.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of proximities in the product space. The figure 
reveals that this distribution is highly skewed, as most linkages (proximities) are very 
weak, below 0.4. Table 1 shows the average proximity within and among 11 product 
groups classified according to Leamer’s (1984) classification.
10 “Within” proximities 
measure the easiness of jumping across products in a given group. On the other hand, 
“among” proximities measure the easiness of jumping from one group to the other one.
11 
The former are significantly higher, reflecting the fact that moving within a group is, in 










                                                 
9 One word of caution: the index of RCA can be problematic, especially if used for comparison of different 
products. For example, a country very well endowed with a specific natural resource can have an RCA in 
the thousands. However, the highest RCA in automobiles is about 3.6. 
10 Appendix table 1 shows Leamer’s (1984) classification. Note that the original Leamer classification 
divides products into ten groups and does not classify some of the SITC (Rev. 2) 2-digit categories. These 
are categorized as in Hidalgo et al. (2007). Also, the Leamer (1984) category “capital-intensive products” is 
split into two: capital-intensive products (excluding metals) and metal products.  
11 Both within and between proximities are unweighted averages and, as discussed above, they are the 
average of the minimum of the two possible conditional probabilities.  
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We interpret a high value of the proximity measure ( ij ϕ ) as an indicator that the 
two goods require similar capabilities. The concept of proximity is based on trade 
outcomes and not physical characteristics of the products. The underlying assumption 
behind the notion of proximity is that if the capabilities needed to produce two different 
products are similar, then this would be revealed in the fact that countries that export one 
good also export the other one. For example, if all countries that export product x with 
RCA also export product y with RCA, then these two products, x and y, require similar 
capabilities. This is reflected in a high value of proximity (a high  ij ϕ ), i.e., the two 
products are “nearby.” If the two products are “nearby” (i.e., a high  ij ϕ ), but a country 
currently exports only one of the two products with RCA, then this country has the 
required capabilities to potentially export the other product also with RCA. Conversely, if 
for a product w exported with RCA there is another product z that is not exported with  
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RCA by any country, then exporting these two products must involve different 
capabilities; this will be represented by a low proximity ( ij ϕ ). 
 
Table 1: Average Proximity within and between Leamer Groups 
   PET  RAW  FOR  TRO  ANI  CER  LAB  CAP  MET  MAC  CHE 
PET  0.356                               
RAW  0.111  0.335                            
FOR  0.106  0.157  0.513                         
TRO  0.126  0.147  0.174  0.454                      
ANI  0.119  0.146  0.183  0.198  0.435                   
CER  0.105  0.127  0.141  0.163  0.160  0.286                
LAB  0.105  0.131  0.178  0.167  0.158  0.131  0.434             
CAP  0.116  0.133  0.171  0.169  0.160  0.144  0.212  0.480          
MET  0.135  0.170  0.221  0.175  0.169  0.149  0.204  0.223  0.568       
MAC  0.109  0.113  0.158  0.110  0.121  0.108  0.168  0.169  0.205  0.447    
CHE  0.145  0.140  0.162  0.147  0.160  0.141  0.157  0.166  0.204  0.198  0.485 
Note: PET-Petroleum; RAW-Raw materials; FOR-Forest products;  
TRO-Troical agriculture; ANI-Animal products; CER-Cereals; LAB-Labor-intensive;  
CAP-Capital-intensive (exc. Metals); MET-Metals; MAC-Machiner; CHE-Chemicals. 
 
 
For each product, we measure the proximity of that product to all other products. This 
measure is called PATH (Hausmann and Klinger 2006) and is simply the sum of all 




PATH ϕ =∑ ,   0≤ PATHi≤ 778 (No. of products -1)   (4) 
 
Products with a high PATH are those that use capabilities that are similar to those used 
by many other products.  
To calculate the proximities, we first calculate the RCA index for a country’s 
exports of commodity i using equation (3) for each of the five years from 2003 to 2007. 
We then average the five values. If the averaged RCA is greater than one, then the 
country has RCA in commodity i. We then obtain the proximities (as in equation (2)) of  
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each product with respect to all the other 778 products. Finally, proximities are used to 
obtain the PATH of each product (equation (4)).  
Based on the distribution of the products according to their sophistication 
(PRODY), we classify all products into high-PRODY, mid-PRODY, or low-PRODY, 
depending on whether they belong to the first, second, or third tercile of the PRODY 
scale. Similarly, we classify each product as being high-PATH, mid-PATH, or low-
PATH. We then assign each product to one of the nine cells of the PRODY-PATH 
matrix. Table 2 shows this matrix, which provides a summary of the information of the 
products in each of the nine cells: the number of products in each cell, the average 
PRODY, and average PATH of the products in each cell. It can be seen that PATH 
increases as we move down across rows (but does not vary across columns for a given 
row), while PRODY increases as one moves to the right across columns (but does not 
vary across rows for a given column). Out of the 779 products that we work with, 352 (45 
percent of the total) are in the four cells MPR_MPA, HPR_MPA, MPR_HPA, 
HPR_HPA (“good” products), and 427 (55 percent of the total) in the other five cells 
(“bad” products). It is worth noting that the LPR_LPA cell contains 93 products, most of 
them cereals and raw materials. On the other hand, the cell HPR_HPA at the other 















Table 2: PRODY-PATH Distribution of the 779 Products 
PRODY   















  (LPR_LPA) 
No. of Products: 93 
Average PRODY: $5,480 
Average PATH: 94 
 (MPR_LPA) 
No. of Products: 64 
Average PRODY: $15,552 
Average PATH: 98 
 (HPR_LPA) 
No. of Products: 103 
Average PRODY: $23,434 















   (LPR_MPA) 
No. of Products: 101 
Average PRODY: $7,196 
Average PATH: 138 
 (MPR_MPA) 
No. of Products: 91 
Average PRODY: $15,027 
Average PATH: 137 
 (HPR_MPA) 
No. of Products: 68 
Average PRODY: $22,697 





















   (LPR_HPA) 
No. of Products: 66  
Average PRODY: $9,132 
Average PATH: 159 
 (MPR_HPA) 
No. of Products: 105 
Average PRODY: $15,360 
Average PATH: 167 
 (HPR_HPA) 
No. of Products: 88 
Average PRODY: $21,227 
Average PATH: 164 
Note: Total number of products at the SITC (Rev. 2) 4-digit level is 779. PRODY is measured in 2005 
PPP$. 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 779 commodities, split into the nine cells. 
We present the distribution according to the 11 Leamer groups. Appendix table 1 shows 
the number of products, average PRODY, and average proximity, as well as the share of 
products in each of the nine cells in table 2 for the 11 Leamer groups and the SITC (Rev. 
2) 2-digit code. The most sophisticated Leamer groups are machinery and chemicals, 
with an average PRODY close to $20,000. These products, together with metals, are also 
the best connected and they tend to be man-made. On the other hand, tropical agriculture 
and cereals are the least sophisticated groups and petroleum the worst connected. These 
products tend to be nature made. 
Figure 2 indicates, for example, that raw materials and cereals account for the 
largest shares within the LPR_LPA cell as well as within the two respective Leamer 
groups. Tropical agriculture is largely a low-PRODY category, though it is equally 
distributed across the three PATH categories. Eighty percent of petroleum products are 
distributed across three cells: MPR_LPA (30 percent), HPR_LPA (20 percent), and 
MPR_MPA (30 percent). Metals are concentrated in the MPR _HPA (39 percent) and 
HPR_HPA (20 percent) cells. Machinery and chemicals are mostly in the mid- and high- 
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PRODY columns, but not exclusively in the high-PATH row, e.g., machinery represents 
54 percent of the HPR_LPA cell and 31 percent of all machinery. 
Although machinery products are present in all three PATH groups—low, mid, 
and high—the products in each of the cells mid- and high-PRODY crossed with each of 
the three PATH categories (six cells) are different. Power generating, metal working, and 
specialized and general industrial machinery dominate HPR_HPA and HPR_MPH cells. 
Electronic products, such as office and data processing, telecommunications, and 
electrical products, dominate the HPR_LPA and MPR_LPA cells.
12  
Metal products, machinery, and chemicals form the core of the product space (see 
Hidalgo et al. 2007) and will be collectively referred to as “core” products in the rest of 
the paper. Figure 2 shows that, on average, core products are the most sophisticated (high 
PRODY) and also provide the highest capabilities to be redeployed to export a large 
number of other products (high PATH). 
                                                 
12 This is not to say that there aren’t any electronic products in the other cells. The two cells HPR_LPA and 
MPR_LPA contain 35 out of the 48 electronic products.  
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The first number above the bar is the share in the 
respective Prody-Path group





































































































































































Forest products are equally distributed across the nine cells. Given that PRODY is 
calculated using GDP per capita, and since some high-income countries such as Canada 
export forest products, the sophistication level of some these products can come out to be 
high.  
Labor-intensive products are predominantly in four cells—low- and mid-PRODY 
products crossed with mid- and high-PATH categories. Labor-intensive products in the 
low-PRODY categories are mainly apparel, footwear, travel goods, and handbag 
products. Labor-intensive products in the mid-PRODY category are mainly nonmetallic 
mineral products and miscellaneous manufactures. Some of the nonmetallic minerals are 
also in the high-PATH cells crossed with high- and mid-PRODY. Lastly, textiles account 
for the presence of capital-intensive products in the four cells obtained from the cross of 
mid- and low-PRODY with mid- and high-PATH categories. 
 
3.2 Country Classification 
Next, we classify countries according to the kind of the products they export with RCA 
(an indicator of the kind of capabilities that a country has accumulated). To do so, we 
calculate for each country the share of products exported with RCA (as percentage of the 
country’s total number of products exported with RCA) that belong to each of the nine 
cells in table 2. We assign each country to the cell with the largest share.  
The LPR_MPH and MPR_HPA cells contain the largest number of countries, 86 
and 25, respectively.
13 Closer inspection shows that there is considerable heterogeneity 
among countries within these two cells. For this reason, we split all countries into two 
groups according to the share of core commodities exported with RCA in the total 
number of commodities exported with RCA. “High-core” countries are those where the 
share of core commodities exported with RCA in the total number of commodities 
exported with RCA is above 30 percent.
14 “Low-core” countries are those where the 
share is less than 30 percent. As argued above, “core commodities” are, on average, the 
                                                 
13 The number of countries in the other cells is as follows: HPR_HPA, 9; HPR-MPA, 3; HPR_LPA, 2; 
MPR_MPA, 11; MPR_LPA, 0; LPR_HPA, 5; and LPR_LPA, 13. 
14 Of the 779 commodities at the 4-digit SITC (Rev. 2) level of disaggregation, 41.1 percent (i.e., 320) are 
core commodities.  
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most sophisticated and the ones with the highest PATH. Countries that export a 
significant share of core commodities face very different prospect from those of countries 
with a low presence in the core. Tables 3 and 4 show the results. Appendix tables 2 and 3 
show, for each of the 154 countries, the percentage of products exported with RCA in 
each of the nine cells (of table 2), the total number of products exported with RCA, and 
the share of core products in the total number of products exported with RCA . This 
allows us to classify all 154 countries into four groups. 
Table 3 (high-core countries, a total of 62) shows that there are no countries in the 
LPR_LPA and MPR_LPA cells. This is an expected result because these are high-core 
countries, i.e., countries where at least 30 percent of the commodities exported with RCA 
are core commodities. The 34 countries in the HPR_HPA, HPR_MPA, MPR_MPA, and 
MPR_HPA cells are mostly high-income countries. These countries are well-positioned. 
The 28 countries in the HPR_LPA (2 countries), LPR_MPA (24 countries), and 
LPR_HPA (2 countries) cells belong to what we refer to as the “middle product” trap. 
Countries like China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Malaysia fall into this 
group. 
Table 4 (low-core countries, a total of 92) shows that there is no single country in 
the high PRODY column as well as in the MPR_LPA cell. This is to be expected as 
countries in this table are low core. Many of the oil-rich countries are in this table in the 
MPR_MPA cell (9 countries). These countries, together with those in the MPR_HPA (5 
countries) and in the LPR_HPA (3 countries), also suffer from a “middle-low product” 
trap.
15 Finally, a large number of low-core countries are in the LPR_LPA and in the 
LPR_MPA cells (a total of 75 countries), i.e., their exports are concentrated in products 
with low sophistication and little or average linkages with the other products. These 
countries are in what we refer to as the “low product” trap.
 16 
                                                 
15 By “worse position” we mean from the point of view of structural transformation. The cell MPR_MPA in 
table 4 for the low-core countries contains relatively rich oil exporters. 
16 This simple criterion is not exempt of problems. While the classification of countries is easy, and in most 
cases the results were what one would expect a priori, it produced several cases difficult to explain. For 
example, high-income countries, like Australia and Iceland, are classified as LPR_MPA countries (table 4) 
alongside low-income countries. In contrast, Sierra Leone is classified as a MPR_HPA country along with 
high-income countries, such as France, the Netherlands, and Spain (table 3).  
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Collectively, we refer to the countries in the three traps as being in a “bad 
product” trap, as they mostly export unsophisticated and unconnected products.
17 
Escaping the “bad product” trap is not straightforward or automatic. This will require 
policy interventions to address market failures, many of which are prevalent in 
developing countries. 
Finally, appendix table 3 provides detailed information on 16 countries that we 
have selected to shed light on why countries are classified in a specific cell, and why they 
are in the trap. It shows the distribution of the total number of commodities exported with 
RCA across the nine cells (of table 2) for the 11 Leamer categories. These countries are:  
 
(i) High-core countries in the middle-product trap: Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, 
and Thailand 
All these are relatively advanced countries with a significant presence in core products, 
although they also export a significant share of not too sophisticated and not too well-
connected commodities with comparative advantage.
18 China’s presence in machinery is 
mostly in electrical, office, and data-processing products, as well as telecommunication 
products. India has significant presence in heavy machinery, and Brazil in heavy 
machinery and vehicles. Malaysia and Thailand also have a significant presence in core 
products largely due to the sophisticated goods they export in the machinery sector. 






                                                 
17 We also tried an alternative classification of countries. In this alternative, we first classify countries 
according to sophistication (PRODY) and PATH, as above. However, PATH is now defined to include 
only linkages outside the product’s SITC 2-digit code, instead of including linkages to all products (i.e., 
including those within the same SITC 2-digit code). We find that the distribution of commodities in the 
nine cells is very similar to the one shown in table 2 (figure 2): 709 out of the 779 products belong to the 
same cell as in table 2 (figure 2). Also, the classification of countries in tables 3 and 4 does not change. 




(ii) Low-core countries in the “low product” trap: Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Chile, Nigeria, and Rwanda 
Algeria and Nigeria export very few products with RCA, 20 and 28, respectively, and 
they have very little presence in core products (6 and 4 commodities, respectively). 
Limited capabilities, as well as a limited presence in core products, indicate that the 
current economic structure of these two countries presents them with limited 
opportunities to escape the low-product trap.  
Bangladesh and Rwanda are better off, as they export a significantly higher 
number of products, 81 and 69 products, respectively, with RCA, but only 6 and 12, 
respectively, are core products; moreover, they do not have a presence in the high-
PRODY and high- and mid-PATH categories. Bangladesh’s exports are mainly labor-
intensive products (in Leamer’s classification), 50 percent of which are in the low-
PRODY–high-PATH cell. A closer inspection reveals that the high linkage of labor-




Table 3: High-core Countries 
PRODY 
HIGH CORE 




















































































Table 4: Low-core Countries 
PRODY 
LOW CORE 



























































































































Chile has been a regional powerhouse since the end of the nineteenth century and 
for decades it has had a history of industrial policy. Agosin, Larrain, and Grau (2009) 
note that the major thrust of the industrial policy framework in Chile is largely 
“horizontal,” designed to resolve economy-wide market failures, improve productivity, 
and raise the technological content of the existing sector. Although Chile does not have a 
clear comparative advantage in manufactured goods, the industrial sector helped establish 
an alternative sector, and the success of the Chilean salmon industry is an example of 
how industrial policy can be used to resolve various market failures. 
Australia is a rich country with a high income per capita. One key reason why 
Australia, despite its strong tilt towards the primary sector, is a rich country (like some 
other exporters of primary products) is that, aware of the dangers of specializing in the 
production of raw materials, long ago it developed a national manufacturing sector, even 
though it would never be able to compete with the industry of the advanced countries. It 
was argued that an industrial sector would provide an alternative source of employment 
and an alternative wage level that would signal that moving production to marginal lands 
was not profitable. In addition, the industrial sector would help mechanize the production 
of wool. This, of course, would not have happened without an active government support. 
 
(iii) Low-core countries in the “middle-low product” trap: Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are, like Algeria and Nigeria, oil 
exporters. However, the former two countries have a much higher per capita income. One 
reason is that they have a certain presence in core products (chemicals), although not as 
significant as that of the middle-product countries. Also, in addition to natural resources, 
what makes Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and some other oil-rich countries) rich is that 
they have been able to develop the service sector. 
 
(iv) High-core countries in the HPR_MPA cell: Ireland and Singapore 
Both Singapore and Ireland export a significant number of core products with RCA, 37 
(43 percent of the total) and 70 (62.5 percent of the total), respectively. Yet, a significant  
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share of their exports is not in the high-PATH cells. This makes it difficult for them to 
jump to other, better-connected, and more sophisticated products. The success of 
Singapore and Ireland must be understood in the context of the role played by industrial 
policy. For example, Ireland’s take off in the 1980s had much to do with the government-
led strategy to succeed in the IT sector, adopted under Prime Minister Charles Haughey. 
In the case of Singapore, industrial development has played a key role in the development 
of the island state during the last 50 years, and the wide range of capabilities acquired as 
a result of being a port has allowed it to venture into complex services. 
 
(v) High-core countries in the HPR_HPA cell: Finland 
In the 1950s, as much as 40 percent of Finland’s employment and output were in the 
primary sector. The growth strategy adopted in the postwar period relied on government 
intervention alongside the private sector to set up a strong manufacturing sector. Today, 
Finland has a significant presence in core products. In the early 1990s, Nokia was a small 
company getting out of the production of rubber boots and cement for tiles into 
electronics. Nokia benefited enormously from Finland’s industrial policy programs. 
 
4. POLICIES TO ESCAPE THE “BAD PRODUCT” TRAP 
 
The analysis in previous sections has allowed us to classify all 154 countries into four 
groups, depending on which export category (based on the PATH-PRODY analysis) is 
the most important one. Accordingly, we propose policies for each of them. Necessarily, 
the policies discussed are generic and, when made operational, they will have to become 
country-specific. 
 
A. High-core Countries That Are Exporters of “Good” Products (34 countries) 
These are countries (table 3) with a high share of exports of core products, and, 
moreover, these products are medium-high PRODY and medium-high PATH. Many of 
these products: (i) are subject increasing returns to scale; (ii) have a high income 
elasticity of export demand; and (iii) are produced under conditions of imperfect  
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competition. Our argument is that these countries became rich because they learned how 
to export these types of products. To do this, they had to accumulate more and more of 
the capabilities that are necessary to master these commodities. This was a path-
dependent process that started in the Middle Ages in some cases (e.g., United Kingdom) 
and supported by a myriad of industrial policy actions, many of which would be illegal 
today (Chang 2002).
19 These countries need to continue upgrading through R&D and 
improvements in the quality of their tertiary education. 
The next three groups, comprising 120 of the 154 countries that we have 
analyzed, are in need of different types of policies to move forward. These are the ones 
that suffer from the “middle” or “low product” traps.  
 
B. High-core Countries in the “Middle Product” Trap (28 countries) 
These countries (table 3) are well-positioned to continue doing well. At least 30 percent 
of the products that they export with RCA are core products. Many of the countries in the 
so-called middle-income trap are in this group. The policies these countries require are of 
two types, depending on the cell they lie in: 
 
•  Competitiveness policy for the two countries in the LPR_HPA cell: Focus on 
quality upgrading of the existing products instead of jumps to new products. 
•  Soft parsimonious industrial policy for the twenty-four countries in the 
LPR_MPA cell and for the two countries in the HPR_LPA cell:  
o  Facilitate horizontal jumps to nearby products. 
o  Develop a process whereby government, industry, and cluster-level private 
organizations can collaborate on interventions that can directly increase 
productivity. 
o  Focus on interventions that deal directly with the coordination problems 
that keep productivity low in existing or raising sectors (e.g., programs 
                                                 
19 See Chang’s (2002) analysis of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, 




and grants to help particular clusters by increasing the supply of skilled 
workers; encourage technology adoption; improve regulation and 
infrastructure). 
 
C. Low-core Countries in the “Middle-low Product” Trap (17 countries) 
The difference between these countries (table 4) and those in the previous group is a 
matter of degree. Emphasis in these countries has to be toward increasing the number of 
core products exported with RCA: 
 
•  Hard parsimonious industrial policy:
20  
o  Facilitate horizontal jumps to far away products. 
o  Tariff exemptions, subsidies for infrastructure, etc. to develop an industry. 
Back up all its public input needs plus some subsidies to get the private 
sector going. 
 
D. Low-core Countries in the “Low-product” Trap (75 countries) 
Sadly, most countries in the world lie in this group (table 4). 
 
•  Many of the products exported by these countries are nature-made and subject to 
decreasing returns. Only industrialization can create an effective agricultural 
sector. None of these countries will ever get rich without an industrial and an 
advanced service sector. 
•  In the traditional trap literature (à la Nelson and Myrdal) there were two ways to 
escape from the low-level equilibrium trap. First, per capita income must be 
raised, in one go, to the point where the trap would not force income per capita 
                                                 
20 These policies have to be consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Amsden (2000) and 
Amsden and Hikino (2000) argue that the new rules of the WTO allow countries to promote their 
industries, including the manufacturing sector, in particular under the umbrella of advancing science and 
technology (e.g., by setting up technology parks). Subsidies in exchange for monitorable, results-oriented 
performance standards are acceptable. Countries can, for example, target national champions. The hurdles 
that developing countries face are the following: (i) informal political pressures by the developed countries 
in favor of market opening; (ii) the subjection of countries that make use of WTO rules to promote their 
industries to “reciprocal control mechanisms”; and (iii) their lack of “vision.”  
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down again to the subsistence level. Second, the growth rate of population must 
decline (e.g., reduction in the birth rate or emigration), and/or that of national 
income increase (e.g., through technical progress or capital from abroad). 
Industrialization greatly increases a country’s ability to sustain a large population. 
•  To a certain extent and under this view, some of these countries may need a “big 
push,” that is, a planned large-scale expansion of a wide range of economic 
activities and achieve a “critical minimum effort” (investment requirements to 
raise per capita income to the level beyond which the further growth of per capita 
income will not be associated with income-depressing forces exceeding income-
raising forces). 
•  The above will not be enough: simply “pumping money” will not help unless a 
critical mass in an increasing returns sector is created. These countries will need 
their governments to take “strategic bets” by getting directly involved in the 
development of new sectors (big leaps). This, however, will be difficult for many 
countries in this group, as, by definition, they lack the required capabilities, as 
defined in section 2.  
•  For this reason, it is imperative that these countries focus their efforts on 
accumulating new capabilities. This will require: (i) human capital to acquire 
skills, technology, and knowledge (in many cases, basic management, accounting, 
and record keeping); (ii) a higher drive to diversify and to increase sophistication 
by embracing a realistic industrial vision; and (iii) improvement in organizational 
abilities (e.g., firm-level organization). 
 
Many of the problems that affect countries in groups B, C, and D (in particular those in 
the last group) above have been studied in the literature from different angles and provide 
complementary insights to the work on structural transformation developed by Hidalgo et 
al (2007). For example, Kremer’s (1993) O-Ring theory of development is an attempt at 
explaining the large differences in income between developed and developing countries. 
Kremer argued that production is often the result of a series of tasks, for example, on an 
assembly line. These tasks can be performed at different levels of “skills,” which refer to  
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the probability of successfully completing the task. For the final product or service to be 
successfully made or delivered, every single task must be completed correctly.
21 This 
implies that the value of each worker’s efforts depends on the quality of all other 
workers’ efforts. Kremer’s theory explains why workers of similar skills have strong 
incentives to match together, i.e., highly skilled workers will attempt to work with other 
highly skilled workers, and low-skilled workers with other low-skilled workers. Highly 
skilled workers complement each other, giving rise to increasing returns to skills and 
even higher productivity; unskilled workers, when they match together, lower each 
others’ productivity even more.
22 
O-ring effects also exist across firms. Suppose one firm builds roads and another 
one automobiles. The additional value to drivers of an improvement in the quality of cars 
most likely will be smaller if the roads happen to be of a poor quality, and vice versa. 
When tasks are performed sequentially (as in global value chains), highly skilled workers 
will perform the tasks at the later, more complex stages of production—which explains 
why poor countries have higher shares of primary output in GDP—and workers will be 
paid more in industries with high-value inputs. Also, under sequential production, 
countries with highly skilled workers specialize in products that require expensive 
intermediate goods, and countries with low-skill workers specialize in primary 
production. In other words, nothing is natural about the international pattern of 
specialization: comparative advantage in primary goods, manufactures, and services is 
itself endogenously determined, or, in the words of Easterly: “Comparative advantage in 
agriculture and manufactures is itself manufactured” (Easterly 2002: 161). The 
                                                 
21 An “o-ring” is a donut-shaped rubber seal. The malfunctioning of one such seal caused the explosion of 
the Challenger space shuttle in 1986. The shuttle had cost billions of dollars, required the cooperation of 
hundreds of teams, and combined a considerable number of components. All this joint effort was lost 
because one seal failed to function properly. 
22 Kremer’s (1993) model explains why highly skilled workers, such as surgeons from India or the 
Philippines, want to migrate to the advanced countries, giving rise to brain drain. They will be much more 
productive after they have migrated, even though their individual skills remain the same. Migration allows 
them to match up with the skilled labor force of the developed country.
22 The matching story also offers an 
explanation of income differences among countries. A small difference in workers’ skills leads to a 
proportionally larger difference in wages and output, so wages and productivity differentials between 




conclusion is that rich and skilled nations will produce “advanced” and “high-value” 
goods” (or the final stages of a process in a global value chain), while the poor nations 
will produce raw materials (primary production in general) and “low-value” goods. 
Under these circumstances, the rich and skilled nations will produce “advanced” 
and “high-value” goods” (or the final stages of a process in a global value chain), while 
the poor nations will produce raw materials (primary production in general) and “low-
value” goods. This is also consistent with Lall’s (2000a) claim that export structures tend 
to be path-dependent and difficult to change, which has important implications for 
growth and development. Indeed, trade patterns are much less responsive to changing 
factor prices than is commonly assumed. Export structures and trade patterns in general 
are the outcome of a long, cumulative process of learning, agglomeration, increasing 
returns, institution building, and business culture. This means that the world’s pattern of 
specialization and trade is, fundamentally, arbitrary—what each country produces is the 
result of history, accidents, and past government policies, and it is not dictated by 
comparative advantage given by tastes, resources, and technology (also, Thirlwall and 
Pacheco-López 2008). 
In related work, Snower (1996) has argued that countries that try to progress by 
exploiting low labor costs (e.g., by restricting wages or through devaluations) may end up 
stuck in a vicious circle of low productivity, deficient training, and a lack of skilled jobs, 
therefore preventing key sectors from competing effectively in the markets for skill-
intensive products. This situation is referred to as a “low-skill, bad-job trap.” “Bad jobs” 
are associated with low wages and few opportunities to accumulate human capital. “Good 
jobs” demand higher skills and command higher wages. Innovating is crucial for 
developing technological capabilities, but it requires well-trained workers. Economies 
can get caught in a vicious circle in which firms do not innovate because the labor force 
is insufficiently skilled, and workers do not have incentives to invest in knowledge 
because there is no demand for these skills. Snower (1996) argues that the relatively low 
demand for and supply of skills in a country derives from rational decisions made by both 
firms and individuals within the particular legal and institutional framework in which 
they operate. Countries with a less-skilled workforce have greater incentives to produce  
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nontraded services rather than tradables such as manufactured goods because the former 
are relatively protected from foreign competition. This pattern of specialization creates 
and perpetuates the demand for less-skilled labor. 
One of the most important consequences of the deficiency in training is that a lack 
of skilled workers leads to the manufacture and export of relatively poor-quality and low-
value products. The manufacture of high-quality products requires highly trained 
workers. But if the country does not generate enough of these workers, firms will be 
forced to produce low-quality goods; likewise, workers will acquire little training because 
few high-quality goods are produced, leading to a vicious circle. The choices made by 
employers reflect the availability of a skilled workforce. Different outputs require 
different types of training. Businesspeople aware that their workers are not highly skilled 
(and thus are more likely to make mistakes) will tend to specialize in the production of 
low-value products. Thus, the labor force will be more suited to the production of low-
value than high-value products. Why can this happen? The reason is that the market does 
not lead to the best possible outcome because, as explained above, private and social 
returns to knowledge are different. Individuals are not fully rewarded for the social 
contribution they make when they invest in knowledge by increasing the stock of 
knowledge available to everyone. They get no reward for this spillover, and so 
contributions to social knowledge will be underprovided. In the end, firms’ decisions 
about what type of products to manufacture depend on the availability of skilled labor. 
The result is that “in countries that offer little support for education and training and that 
contain a large proportion of unskilled workers, the market mechanism may reinforce the 
existing lack of skills by providing little incentive to acquire more; whereas in countries 
with well-functioning educational and training institutions and large bodies of skilled 
labor, the free market may do much more to induce people to become skilled” (Snower 
1996: 112). 
Finally, Sutton (2001, 2005) has argued that if two countries differ in their levels 
of capability, this will be reflected as a difference in their real wage levels. Low wages do 
not compensate for low quality, with the consequence that the low-quality firms will be 
excluded from the market. Indeed, one of the most important effects of globalization is  
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competition in “capability building.” This will lead to a shakeout of firms in low-
capability countries. Can capabilities be transferred? Maybe yes, but this is a slow, 
expensive, and painstaking process,
23 and from the point of view of a high-quality 
producer moving to a low-wage country need not be optimal; first because it operates in 
an environment where she relies on suppliers of intermediate inputs that probably are not 
present in the low-wage country and, second, because the firm’s capabilities are 
embodied in the tact knowledge possessed jointly by those individuals who comprise the 
firm’s workforce.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS: IT’S THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE…DUH! 
 
In this paper we have argued that what sets apart countries is their productive structure 
and the specific characteristics of the products that they export. These, in turn, depend on 
the capabilities that the firms possess. Development in this paradigm is a process of 
generating new activities and letting others disappear. The primary driver of growth is the 
gradual build-up in firms’ capabilities, which raises the economy-wide real wage. Capital 
accumulation is a complementary effect: the higher real wage makes it profitable for each 
firm to shift to more capital-intensive techniques. As the firm makes that shift, the rise in 
its capital-labor ratio further raises the marginal revenue product of labor at the firm 
level, and so underpins the rising real wage. 
Using measures of product sophistication and connectivity, we have shown that 
not all products are the same. Using the SITC 4-digit level containing 779 products, we 
have determined that 427 (about 55 percent) are not very sophisticated and/or not well-
connected to the other products. This has allowed us to split the 154 countries in our 
analysis into four groups: (i) a group of 34 countries that export mostly “good” products. 
These are sophisticated and well-connected products, and in general, are man-made; (ii) a 
                                                 
23 Sutton (2005) argues that a good proxy for the cost of transferring a capability is given by counting the 
number of individuals that are needed to assemble in order to form a sufficient subset of employees who 
can carry the capability. The important things that must be transferred relate not so much to items that can 
be successfully reduced to a statement in a manual, but rather to complex and interrelated patterns of 
working practices that are extremely difficult and time-consuming to unravel and redesign.  
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group of 28 countries that export a significant share of core products, although not as 
sophisticated and well-connected as those exported by the countries in the previous 
group. These countries are in a “middle product” trap; (iii) a group of 17 countries that 
export few core products. They export products of that are in the middle of the 
sophistication and connectedness scale. They are in a “middle-low product trap”; and (iv) 
a large group of 75 countries that mostly export unsophisticated and poorly-connected 
products. They are in a “low-product” trap. Countries in these two groups specialize in 
nature-made products, subject to decreasing returns to scale. 
The policies that the countries in the last three groups require range from 
competitiveness and soft parsimonious industrial policy to aggressive policies that lead to 
the rapid accumulation of relevant capabilities, as well as strategic bets with significant 
government intervention. Historically, it has been impossible to become a rich country 
without creating an industrial sector and an advanced service sector. Likewise, 
historically, no country has become rich without explicit government interventions that 
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Appendix Table 1: Average PRODY, Average Proximity, and Distribution (percentage of the total number of products) 




























PETROLEUM  10  16,352 0.118 10.0     20.0  10.0  30.0  30.0          
33  Petroleum and petroleum products  10  16,352  0.118  10.0     20.0  10.0  30.0  30.0          
RAW MATERIALS  62  11,228 0.142 0.0  4.8  6.5  4.8  12.9  12.9  8.1  17.7  32.3 
27  Crude fertilizer and crude minerals  18  11,650  0.146     11.1  5.6  11.1  16.7  5.6  5.6  22.2  22.2 
28  Metalliferous ores  16  7,784  0.118              6.3  18.8  6.3  25.0  43.8 
32  Coal  6  11,497  0.128              16.7  33.3        50.0 
34  Gas  3  16,362  0.085        33.3        33.3        33.3 
35  Electric current  1  9,793  0.202                    100.0      
68  Non-ferrous metals  17  13,487  0.155     5.9  11.8  5.9  17.6  5.9  11.8  17.6  23.5 
97  Gold, non-monetary  1  4,769  0.122                          100.0
FOREST PRODUCTS  39  15,593 0.175 7.7  10.3  17.9  23.1  10.3  2.6  7.7  15.4  5.1 
24  Cork and wood  9  10,155  0.145              33.3  11.1     44.4  11.1 
25  Pulp and waste paper  6  21,073  0.146     33.3  66.7                   
63  Cork and wood, cork manufactures  11  13,186  0.171        18.2  36.4        18.2  18.2  9.1 
64  Paper  13  18,867  0.204  23.1  15.4  7.7  38.5  7.7     7.7       
TROPICAL AGRICULTURE  46  8,755 0.16           8.7  13.0  4.3  23.9  26.1  23.9 
5  Vegetables and fruit  22  9,042  0.162           4.5  13.6  4.5  27.3  40.9  9.1 
6  Sugar  6  8,898  0.169           16.7        50.0  16.7  16.7 
7  Coffee  10  5,941  0.134           10.0        10.0  20.0  60.0 
11  Beverages  5  11,462  0.169              40.0  20.0  20.0     20.0 
23  Crude rubber  3  11,226  0.152           33.3  33.3           33.3 
ANIMAL PRODUCTS  52  12,701 0.162 7.7  7.7  3.8  11.5  19.2  5.8  1.9  25.0  17.3 
0  Live animals  5  14,448  0.152     20.0  20.0  20.0           20.0  20.0 






























2  Dairy products  6  17,661  0.195  33.3  16.7     33.3  16.7             
3  Fish  8  12,230  0.135              25.0  25.0     12.5  37.5 
21  Hides, skins  7  8,905  0.145     14.3              14.3  42.9  28.6 
29  Crude animal and vegetable materials  9  7,171  0.148              22.2        55.6  22.2 
43  Animal and vegetable oils and fats  4  9,642  0.161           25.0  25.0        25.0  25.0 
94  Animals, live (nes)  1  4,526  0.140                       100.0   
CEREALS  80  9,089 0.141 2.5  1.3  5.0  8.8  7.5  8.8  10.0  20.0  36.3 
4  Cereals  16  11,446  0.160        6.3  25.0  18.8     6.3  25.0  18.8 
8  Feeds  5  11,413  0.140           20.0     40.0     40.0    
9  Miscellaneous edible products  3  16,452  0.194  33.3        33.3        33.3       
12  Tobacco  6  6,302  0.147                    16.7  66.7  16.7 
22  Oil seeds  12  6,048  0.112              8.3  8.3  16.7  8.3  58.3 
26  Textile fibres  24  8,101  0.126     4.2  4.2  4.2  8.3  8.3  12.5  12.5  45.8 
41  Animal oils and fats  2  19,495  0.152        100.0                  
42  Fixed vegetable oils and fats  12  7,814  0.119  8.3              16.7     16.7  58.3 
LABOR INTENSIVE  98  13,691 0.183 8.2  5.1  8.2  13.3  13.3  10.2  19.4  15.3  7.1 
66  Non-metallic mineral  32  16,037  0.183  18.8  12.5  12.5  12.5  15.6  6.3  9.4  9.4  3.1 
82  Furniture  3  14,019  0.215           100.0               
83  Travel goods, handbags  1  11,549  0.139                          100.0
84  Articles of apparel  28  8,103  0.170              3.6     53.6  32.1  10.7 
85  Footwear  1  9,793  0.175                       100.0   
89  Miscellaneous manufacture  31  16,277  0.167  6.5  3.2  12.9  19.4  16.1  25.8  3.2  6.5  6.5 
93  Special transactions, not classified  1  16,992  0.145              100.0            
96  Coin (other than gold coin)  1  16,680  0.156              100.0            
CAPITAL INTENSIVE  72  12,693 0.185 11.1  0.0  1.4  20.8  19.4  2.8  15.3  18.1  11.1 






























62  Rubber  9  16,371  0.215  11.1        44.4  33.3     11.1       
65  Textile yarn, fabrics  49  12,316  0.177  10.2     2.0  18.4  18.4  2.0  16.3  18.4  14.3 
81  Sanitary fixtures and fittings, nes  3  16,210  0.204  33.3              33.3  33.3       
METALS  46  15,307 0.204 19.6  8.7  0.0  39.1  6.5  4.3  6.5  8.7  6.5 
67  Iron and steel  22  14,526  0.197  13.6        45.5  13.6  4.5  9.1  9.1  4.5 
69  Manufactures of metals, nes  24  16,023  0.204  25.0  16.7     33.3     4.2  4.2  8.3  8.3 
MACHINERY  180  19,745 0.19 19.4  14.4  31.1  8.9  8.3  11.7  2.2  3.3  0.6 
71  Power generating  19  20,046  0.179  31.6  10.5  31.6  15.8     10.5          
72  Specialized for particular industries  28  21,157  0.179  17.9  21.4  28.6  17.9  7.1  3.6     3.6    
73  Metalworking  8  21,788  0.183  25.0  50.0  25.0                   
74  General industrial  26  21,619  0.208  65.4  19.2  7.7  3.8     3.8          
75  Office and data processing  11  20,980  0.127     9.1  63.6     9.1  18.2          
76  Telecommunications  12  17,610  0.138        33.3        66.7          
77  Electrical  25  18,514  0.169  8.0  4.0  32.0  8.0  20.0  24.0  4.0       
78  Road vehicles  13  16,602  0.190  15.4  15.4  7.7  23.1  15.4  7.7  7.7  7.7    
79  Other transport equipment  16  15,513  0.156  6.3  12.5  12.5  6.3  25.0     6.3  25.0  6.3 
87  Professional and scientific instruments  11  21,663  0.163     27.3  63.6  9.1                
88  Photographic equipment  10  22,746  0.117        90.0     10.0             
95 
Armoured vehicles, firearms, and 
ammunition  1  9,641  0.181                    100.0      
CHEMICALS  94  19,872 0.188 19.1  22.3  20.2  13.8  9.6  5.3  1.1  5.3  3.2 
51  Organic  22  24,464  0.175  13.6  36.4  36.4  4.5  4.5  4.5          
52  Inorganic  11  13,478  0.168  9.1     9.1  9.1  27.3  18.2     9.1  18.2 
53  Dyeing and tanning  8  18,677  0.195  25.0  50.0        12.5        12.5    
54  Medicinal and pharmaceutical  7  25,168  0.181  42.9  28.6  28.6                   






























56  Fertilizers  4  10,867  0.151              25.0     25.0  25.0  25.0 
57  Explosives  3  14,486  0.152           33.3  33.3  33.3          
58  Artificial resins and plastic  23  21,815  0.183  30.4  26.1  26.1  8.7  4.3  4.3          
59  Chemical materials, nes  10  18,473  0.189  20.0  10.0  10.0  50.0  10.0             
 
Note: HPR_HPA-High PRODY-High PATH; HPR_MPA-High PRODY-Mid PATH; HPR_LPA-High PRODY-Low PATH; MPR_HPA-Mid PRODY-High 
PATH; MPR_MPA-Mid PRODY-Mid PATH; MPR_LPA-Mid PRODY-Low PATH LPR_HPA-Low PRODY-High PATH; LPR_MPA-Low PRODY-Mid 




Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Exports across the Nine Cells: High-core 
Countries  
































Armenia   11.6 7.4  7.4 17.4  9.1  4.1 11.6  19.8  11.6 121  37.2 
Austria   25.5  14.3 6.2 23.9  8.5  3.1 10.0 6.6  1.9  259  53.7 
Barbados   12.5 3.9 13.3  19.5 12.5  9.4 10.2  11.7 7.0  128  39.8 
Belarus   17.8 3.3  2.6 29.0 13.2  4.6 17.8 9.2  2.6  152  32.9 
Belgium   18.4  11.5  6.8  22.3  13.3 4.3 9.7 9.4 4.3 278  42.1 
Belize   10.8  11.8 5.4 14.0  9.7  6.5  8.6 21.5  11.8  93  35.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  9.0  3.0  3.6 24.0 13.8  1.8 19.8  18.6 6.6  167  32.3 
Brazil   8.0 5.5 8.0  16.9  13.4 4.5 9.5  17.4  16.9 201  38.8 
Bulgaria   10.3 3.4  3.9 20.6 11.2  1.7 21.9  21.9 5.2  233  31.8 
Burundi   8.9 6.3 3.8  16.5  10.1 3.8  10.1  20.3  20.3 79  39.2 
Canada   13.2 7.8  9.3 22.0 15.1  5.4  6.3 13.2 7.8  205  29.8 
China   6.6 4.7 9.3  13.6  11.2  13.2  14.3  17.4  9.7 258  35.7 
Hong Kong, China   3.8  6.5  12.4 11.3  14.0  15.6 11.3 15.6  9.7  186  34.9 
Costa Rica   1.1 3.2 5.3  25.3  10.5 6.3  15.8  20.0  12.6 95  29.5 
Croatia   17.0 3.6  4.9 23.2 11.6  1.3 19.6  15.6 3.1  224  35.3 
Cyprus   12.2 7.4  7.4 11.1 13.8  4.8 15.3  16.9  11.1 189  34.4 
Czech Rep.  19.5  11.9 4.3 24.9 11.9  5.4 13.0 7.6  1.4  277  48.0 
Denmark   23.7  11.4  8.3  21.1  11.8 4.4 7.9 8.8 2.6 228  46.5 
Finland   26.7 14.0 13.4 16.3  11.1  2.3  7.6  6.4  2.3  172  59.3 
France   19.8 10.8 10.8 23.3  12.7  2.2  8.6  8.6  3.2  314  51.0 
Gambia   7.8  3.9 11.7 9.1  10.4  6.5  9.1 23.4  18.2  77  32.5 
Georgia   4.4 3.6 8.0 9.4 15.9 8.0  14.5  22.5  13.8 138  34.8 
Germany   24.3 16.3 12.8 21.4  11.3  4.2  5.6  3.0  1.2  337  62.6 
Guinea-Bissau   4.0  5.0  18.8 11.9  5.0  8.9  15.8 16.8 13.9  101  45.5 
Hungary   17.4 4.4  9.2 25.0 11.4  6.0 14.7 9.2  2.7  184  41.8 
India   7.4 6.2 5.0  12.4  12.0 3.5  14.0  22.9  16.7 258  31.8 
Ireland   11.6 12.8 24.4 10.5  11.6  8.1  4.7  9.3  7.0  86  43.0 
Israel   11.7 11.0 14.1 13.5  11.0  4.9  8.6  16.6  8.6  163  50.3 
Italy   20.7  11.6 6.7 21.3 10.1  3.1 11.6  11.3 3.7  328  49.7 
Japan   19.4 18.4 22.9 11.4  11.0  9.0  3.0  3.0  2.0  201  75.1 
Jordan   4.0  3.3  4.6 22.5 15.9  4.0 15.9  22.5 7.3  151  31.1 
Lebanon   8.6 4.8 6.7  19.1  10.0 6.2  13.3  21.4  10.0 210  30.0 
Liberia   10.3  3.5 0.0 3.5 13.8 6.9  13.8  20.7  27.6 29  41.4 
Malaysia   4.7  1.9 19.8  11.3 11.3 17.9 7.6 11.3  14.2 106  46.2 
Malta   8.2 6.9  16.4  17.8  17.8 9.6 8.2 8.2 6.9  73  47.9 
Mexico   10.7 7.3 12.7  14.0  9.3  8.0 15.3  19.3 3.3  150  52.0 
Netherlands   13.5 12.2 15.1 18.5  12.2  4.2  5.9  10.5  8.0  238  44.1 
Niger   5.6 4.4 4.4  11.1 8.9  7.8 6.7  26.7  24.4 90  34.4  
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Norway   16.8 10.5 14.7 11.6  16.8  6.3  5.3  9.5  8.4  95  46.3 
Panama   5.2 3.3 6.5  13.1  13.7  13.1  13.1  22.2  9.8 153  30.7 
Philippines   3.0  3.0  14.9  6.9  6.9  12.9 14.9 24.8 12.9  101  34.7 
Poland   18.7 4.9  3.4 24.7 10.1  4.9 18.7  12.4 2.3  267  34.8 
Portugal   12.4 6.2  6.2 23.0  9.6  4.3 19.1  13.4 5.7  209  31.1 
Rep. of Korea  13.5 10.1 12.2 18.2  18.9  9.5  6.1  8.1  3.4  148  56.8 
Romania   11.0 3.4  3.4 22.0  9.1  3.4 19.6  21.1 7.2  209  35.9 
Russian Federation   3.8  5.7  8.6 13.3 15.2 11.4 8.6 15.2  18.1 105  41.0 
Saint Kitts, Nevis 
and Anguilla  9.5 4.7 6.1  10.8  17.6 8.1  10.8  22.3  10.1 148  40.5 
Samoa   5.2  5.2  17.2  6.9  13.8  10.3 12.1 19.0 10.3  58  37.9 
Senegal   4.3 5.5 4.9  15.2  10.4 4.9  12.2  28.7  14.0 164  31.1 
Seychelles   4.4  6.7 11.1  17.8  6.7  13.3 8.9 15.6  15.6  45  40.0 
Sierra Leone   15.0 7.5  3.3 18.3 10.8  6.7  9.2 14.2  15.0 120  37.5 
Singapore   10.7  14.3  28.6  7.1 11.6 9.8 1.8 8.0 8.0 112  62.5 
Slovakia   20.3 7.0  1.6 34.2  9.1  3.2 12.8  10.2 1.6  187  43.9 
Slovenia   22.6  11.1 4.5 26.3  9.1  2.5 12.4 9.5  2.1  243  48.6 
South Africa   6.3 4.3 4.3  18.8  13.0 7.7  10.1  21.2  14.4 208  31.3 
Spain   19.2 9.6  5.6 23.2 11.9  4.3 10.9  11.3 4.0  302  41.1 
Sweden   23.4 12.9 15.9 21.4  11.0  4.5  6.5  3.0  1.5  201  59.2 
Switzerland   22.8 17.5 16.5 15.1  7.8  3.9  6.8  6.8  2.9  206  64.6 
Thailand   7.4  2.0  9.4 18.3 14.9  9.9 11.4  18.3 8.4  202  34.7 
USA   20.0 13.1 18.4 15.6  10.0  5.0  5.0  9.4  3.4  320  56.9 
Ukraine   9.4  3.7  3.7 17.8 16.2  6.3 17.8  15.7 9.4  191  37.2 
United Kingdom   18.6 14.1 17.3 18.2  12.5  4.0  6.5  4.0  4.8  248  56.9 
Note: Numbers reported in the first nine columns are the share of each of the nine cells of table 2 in the 
total number of products exported with RCA (Also see note to appendix table 1). RCA_total is the total 
number of products exported with RCA by each country. share_core is the share of the number of core 
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Albania   7.3  2.4  4.2  14.6  9.7  3.6  18.8  33.3  6.1  165  22.4 
Algeria   0.0  0.0  10.0  5.0  30.0  5.0  5.0  30.0  15.0  20  30.0 
Angola   14.3  0.0  28.6  0.0  14.3  14.3  0.0  14.3  14.3  7  0.0 
Argentina   6.4  2.9  7.0  21.6  12.9  5.3  9.9  21.6  12.3  171  25.1 
Australia   2.9  5.0  6.4  10.7  18.6  7.1  7.1  22.9  19.3  140  15.0 
Azerbaijan   1.5  4.4  10.1  1.5  11.6  4.4  14.5  33.3  18.8  69  23.2 
Bahrain  4.3  6.4  8.5  21.3  18.1  6.4  11.7  13.8  9.6  94  30.8 
Bangladesh   0.0  0.0  0.0  3.7  11.1  2.5  28.4  37.0  17.3  81  7.4 
Benin   3.3  1.1  2.2  8.8  11.0  2.2  13.2  36.3  22.0  91  22.0 
Bolivia   3.5  1.2  5.8  5.8  9.2  2.3  9.2  40.2  23.0  87  17.2 
Burkina Faso   5.2  0.0  0.0  13.0  11.7  3.9  13.0  32.5  20.8  77  22.1 
Cambodia   0.0  1.4  0.0  5.6  9.7  5.6  26.4  38.9  12.5  72  12.5 
Cameroon   0.0  0.0  0.0  4.1  6.1  4.1  14.3  40.8  30.6  49  10.2 
Central African Rep.  2.1  8.5  2.1  17.0  8.5  2.1  10.6  21.3  27.7  47  23.4 
Chad   6.7  0.0  13.3  13.3  13.3  13.3  13.3  6.7  20.0  15  26.7 
Chile   2.8  0.9  9.2  14.7  16.5  6.4  15.6  22.0  11.9  109  15.6 
China, Macao SAR  5.6  2.8  7.0  9.9  11.3  8.5  25.4  22.5  7.0  71  15.5 
Colombia   6.1  3.4  2.7  21.6  13.5  3.4  18.2  18.2  12.8  148  20.9 
Congo   0.0  3.3  6.7  0.0  0.0  13.3  10.0  26.7  40.0  30  6.7 
Côte d'Ivoire   2.5  0.0  3.7  11.1  3.7  4.9  16.1  27.2  30.9  81  18.5 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo  4.4  2.2  2.2  2.2  4.4  8.9  6.7  28.9  40.0  45  17.8 
Djibouti   7.9  5.0  3.6  17.9  6.4  5.0  11.4  25.7  17.1  140  27.1 
Dominican Rep.  5.1  5.1  4.3  12.8  8.6  1.7  19.7  29.9  12.8  117  20.5 
Ecuador   2.6  1.3  3.9  9.1  10.4  6.5  16.9  24.7  24.7  77  11.7 
Egypt   4.5  2.3  2.3  18.0  12.9  4.5  18.5  25.8  11.2  178  24.2 
El Salvador   2.5  2.5  4.1  24.0  9.1  3.3  22.3  24.8  7.4  121  22.3 
Equatorial Guinea   0.0  0.0  28.6  0.0  0.0  14.3  14.3  14.3  28.6  7  14.3 
Estonia   14.4  4.6  6.7  19.5  9.7  5.6  15.9  14.4  9.2  195  27.7 
Ethiopia   2.0  0.0  4.0  8.0  10.0  4.0  13.0  35.0  24.0  100  9.0 
Fiji   2.5  2.5  3.3  10.7  10.7  6.6  21.3  30.3  12.3  122  15.6 
Gabon   0.0  4.2  8.3  0.0  8.3  8.3  20.8  29.2  20.8  24  20.8 
Ghana   0.9  1.8  1.8  12.4  8.9  2.7  15.9  30.1  25.7  113  16.8 
Greece   11.2  3.0  1.3  21.0  12.5  5.2  16.7  20.2  9.0  233  26.6 
Guatemala   2.7  2.7  0.7  23.2  8.0  1.3  24.5  23.8  13.3  151  15.9 
Guinea   0.0  0.0  2.1  10.4  10.4  8.3  8.3  22.9  37.5  48  20.8 
Guyana   3.9  2.6  2.6  11.7  11.7  6.5  13.0  27.3  20.8  77  23.4 
Haiti   0.0  1.5  1.5  7.6  7.6  4.6  24.2  37.9  15.2  66  10.6 
Honduras   0.0  3.8  1.9  13.2  7.6  0.9  19.8  35.9  17.0  106  12.3  
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Iceland   9.4  9.4  9.4  1.6  17.2  12.5  3.1  23.4  14.1  64  25.0 
Indonesia   4.0  5.8  5.8  12.6  12.6  8.5  13.9  20.2  16.6  223  21.1 
Iran   0.0  2.6  6.5  7.8  20.8  6.5  7.8  27.3  20.8  77  11.7 
Jamaica   3.4  6.8  5.1  6.8  17.0  6.8  13.6  27.1  13.6  59  22.0 
Kazakhstan   5.4  0.0  3.3  8.7  16.3  9.8  6.5  25.0  25.0  92  27.2 
Kenya   1.2  2.4  3.0  18.3  9.5  3.6  14.8  30.2  17.2  169  16.6 
Kiribati   1.8  3.6  3.6  7.1  17.9  8.9  10.7  32.1  14.3  56  23.2 
Kuwait   8.3  8.3  20.8  8.3  20.8  12.5  4.2  8.3  8.3  24  25.0 
Kyrgyzstan   4.3  3.1  4.9  12.8  12.2  3.1  21.3  26.2  12.2  164  23.2 
Lao People's Dem. 
Rep.  3.2  1.1  1.1  5.4  12.9  1.1  19.4  35.5  20.4  93  12.9 
Latvia   12.8  5.9  3.7  19.6  10.5  5.5  21.0  16.9  4.1  219  25.6 
Libya   5.0  5.0  15.0  0.0  30.0  15.0  5.0  5.0  20.0  20  50.0 
Lithuania   9.8  4.0  3.6  20.5  13.8  4.0  18.8  21.4  4.0  224  27.7 
Madagascar   0.0  0.0  6.7  9.6  7.7  4.8  18.3  38.5  14.4  104  12.5 
Malawi   3.7  1.2  0.0  6.1  11.0  3.7  23.2  37.8  13.4  82  19.5 
Mali   4.1  6.8  2.7  8.1  12.2  5.4  5.4  31.1  24.3  74  28.4 
Mauritania   3.6  0.0  3.6  0.0  14.3  17.9  0.0  21.4  39.3  28  10.7 
Mauritius   5.1  3.4  7.6  11.0  7.6  11.0  16.1  27.1  11.0  118  24.6 
Mongolia   1.9  1.0  2.9  6.8  16.5  2.9  23.3  30.1  14.6  103  12.6 
Morocco   3.9  0.0  4.6  6.9  11.5  7.7  22.3  35.4  7.7  130  10.8 
Mozambique   5.1  4.1  2.0  5.1  13.3  5.1  8.2  31.6  25.5  98  21.4 
Nepal   2.4  3.5  3.5  19.4  9.4  4.1  20.6  24.1  12.9  170  18.8 
New Zealand   10.6  5.6  8.1  19.9  13.0  5.6  11.8  17.4  8.1  161  23.0 
Nicaragua   3.0  1.0  3.0  7.1  8.1  4.0  23.2  34.3  16.2  99  10.1 
Nigeria   0.0  0.0  3.6  3.6  7.1  7.1  3.6  35.7  39.3  28  14.3 
Oman   6.7  4.4  2.2  17.8  22.2  6.7  8.9  20.0  11.1  45  24.4 
Pakistan   2.0  0.7  2.0  9.5  12.2  4.7  20.3  35.1  13.5  148  9.5 
Papua New Guinea   0.0  0.0  2.0  2.0  12.2  10.2  8.2  32.7  32.7  49  8.2 
Paraguay   1.1  1.1  3.2  13.8  6.4  2.1  13.8  36.2  22.3  94  10.6 
Peru   1.5  3.8  3.0  12.0  15.0  5.3  14.3  27.8  17.3  133  18.0 
Qatar   3.5  10.3  31.0  6.9  10.3  17.2  13.8  3.5  3.5  29  51.7 
Rep. of Moldova  9.4  3.4  3.4  12.8  10.7  3.4  23.5  27.5  6.0  149  23.5 
Rwanda   1.5  2.9  4.4  8.7  14.5  7.3  10.1  33.3  17.4  69  27.5 
Saudi Arabia   3.6  10.7  14.3  12.5  19.6  10.7  8.9  10.7  8.9  56  30.4 
Sri Lanka   2.3  3.0  1.5  11.4  9.1  5.3  20.5  28.0  18.9  132  9.1 
Sudan   2.0  0.0  6.1  2.0  8.2  4.1  4.1  42.9  30.6  49  16.3 
Suriname   2.4  4.9  0.0  2.4  17.1  7.3  2.4  31.7  31.7  41  19.5 
Syria   2.7  0.7  4.1  14.2  13.5  4.1  19.6  27.0  14.2  148  11.5 
Tajikistan   3.0  0.0  6.0  11.9  10.5  4.5  14.9  35.8  13.4  67  22.4 
TFYR of Macedonia  6.5  0.0  0.7  18.2  11.7  2.0  26.0  28.6  6.5  154  22.1  
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Togo   2.1  1.4  1.4  19.9  9.2  3.6  19.2  26.2  17.0  141  22.0 
Trinidad and Tobago   5.8  3.9  7.7  13.5  19.2  13.5  15.4  13.5  7.7  52  34.6 
Tunisia   2.0  2.6  4.6  16.5  9.2  5.3  25.0  27.6  7.2  152  23.7 
Turkey   7.6  2.1  0.8  28.3  11.8  3.0  18.6  21.5  6.3  237  26.6 
Turkmenistan   0.0  0.0  2.5  5.0  10.0  2.5  12.5  42.5  25.0  40  15.0 
Uganda   2.9  3.7  1.5  13.2  7.4  5.2  12.5  31.6  22.1  136  26.5 
United Arab 
Emirates   1.6  3.3  13.1  14.8  18.0  8.2  14.8  13.1  13.1  61  26.2 
United Rep. of 
Tanzania  3.8  2.5  3.8  4.4  12.0  4.4  10.7  35.9  22.6  159  16.4 
Uruguay   6.0  4.7  8.7  15.3  16.7  4.7  10.7  20.7  12.7  150  24.7 
Uzbekistan   4.8  2.4  2.4  7.2  14.5  2.4  13.3  31.3  21.7  83  21.7 
Venezuela   1.7  5.1  8.5  11.9  20.3  6.8  13.6  15.3  17.0  59  33.9 
Viet Nam   2.5  0.0  3.8  10.1  10.7  6.9  21.4  22.6  22.0  159  13.8 
Yemen   1.4  2.8  4.2  2.8  14.1  11.3  8.5  35.2  19.7  71  18.3 
Zambia   6.3  3.2  4.2  13.7  9.5  6.3  9.5  29.5  17.9  95  18.9 
Note: Numbers reported in the first nine columns are the share of each of the nine cells of table 2 in the 
total number of products exported with RCA (also see note to appendix table 1). RCA_total is the total 
number of products exported with RCA by each country. share_core is the share of the number of core 
products exported with RCA in the total number of products exported with RCA.  
 
49
Appendix Table 3: Distribution of Products across the Nine Cells: Selected 
Countries (based on averaged RCA for the years 2003 to 2007) 




















BRAZIL  201  8.0  5.5  8.0  16.9  13.4  4.5  9.5  17.4  16.9 
   PETROLEUM                               
   RAW MATERIALS  15     6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  13.3     20.0  40.0 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  18  5.6  11.1  11.1  22.2  11.1     16.7  16.7  5.6 
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  20              15.0  5.0  20.0  35.0  25.0 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  16  12.5     6.3  12.5  31.3        18.8  18.8 
   CEREALS  26     3.8        3.8  3.8  7.7  26.9  53.8 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  12  16.7  8.3  8.3  25.0  16.7     8.3  16.7    
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  16           18.8  25.0     31.3  6.3  18.8 
   METALS  18           33.3  16.7  11.1  16.7  16.7  5.6 
   MACHINERY  37  18.9  16.2  18.9  24.3  5.4  8.1     5.4  2.7 
   CHEMICALS  23  17.4     17.4  26.1  17.4     4.3  17.4    
                                   
CHINA  258  6.6  4.7  9.3  13.6  11.2  13.2  14.3  17.4  9.7 
   PETROLEUM  2           50.0     50.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  11     9.1     9.1        9.1  36.4  36.4 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  7  14.3        28.6        14.3  28.6  14.3 
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  11           9.1        36.4  45.5  9.1 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  10           10.0  30.0  10.0     40.0  10.0 
   CEREALS  8                    25.0  12.5  62.5 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  69  2.9  5.8  1.4  14.5  11.6  13.0  23.2  18.8  8.7 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  48  6.3        18.8  16.7  2.1  22.9  22.9  10.4 
   METALS  19  36.8  10.5     15.8  5.3  5.3  5.3  15.8  5.3 
   MACHINERY  55  1.8  3.6  40.0  7.3  12.7  30.9  1.8  1.8    
   CHEMICALS  18  16.7  16.7  5.6  16.7  11.1  22.2     5.6  5.6 
                                   
INDIA  258  7.4  6.2  5.0  12.4  12.0  3.5  14.0  22.9  16.7 
   PETROLEUM  1              100.0             
   RAW MATERIALS  27     3.7  3.7  3.7  18.5  14.8  3.7  22.2  29.6 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  2                    50.0  50.0    
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  17           5.9        41.2  35.3  17.6 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  13  7.7        7.7  23.1  7.7     23.1  30.8 
   CEREALS  31           3.2  6.5     9.7  38.7  41.9 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  40     5.0  2.5  7.5  12.5  2.5  30.0  30.0  10.0 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  45  2.2        20.0  11.1     22.2  26.7  17.8 
   METALS  23  17.4        39.1  13.0     8.7  13.0  8.7 
   MACHINERY  25  24.0  12.0  16.0  12.0  16.0  8.0     8.0  4.0 
   CHEMICALS  34  20.6  29.4  20.6  11.8  8.8  2.9     5.9    
                                   
MALAYSIA  106  4.7  1.9  19.8  11.3  11.3  17.9  7.5  11.3  14.2 
   PETROLEUM  1           100.0                 
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   RAW MATERIALS  7        14.3     14.3  14.3  14.3     42.9 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  9           11.1        22.2  44.4  22.2 
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  6           16.7        16.7  16.7  50.0 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  9           33.3  22.2        33.3  11.1 
   CEREALS  10                 10.0  10.0  30.0  50.0 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  12  8.3     16.7  25.0  25.0     16.7     8.3 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  3           66.7  33.3             
   METALS  4  25.0        25.0     25.0  25.0       
   MACHINERY  37     2.7  43.2     13.5  40.5          
   CHEMICALS  8  37.5  12.5  25.0        12.5     12.5    
                                   
THAILAND  202  7.4  2.0  9.4  18.3  14.9  9.9  11.4  18.3  8.4 
   PETROLEUM  4        25.0     50.0  25.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  6              16.7     16.7  16.7  50.0 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  7  14.3        42.9  14.3        28.6    
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  16           6.3  6.3     37.5  37.5  12.5 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  16           12.5  31.3  12.5     25.0  18.8 
   CEREALS  18     5.6     16.7  11.1     16.7  27.8  22.2 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  32  6.3        15.6  6.3  12.5  15.6  37.5  6.3 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  33           33.3  21.2     24.2  15.2  6.1 
   METALS  8  25.0        50.0           12.5  12.5 
   MACHINERY  47  12.8  2.1  31.9  10.6  12.8  27.7     2.1    
   CHEMICALS  15  26.7  13.3  20.0  20.0  20.0             
                                   
ALGERIA  20        10.0  5.0  30.0  5.0  5.0  30.0  15.0 
   PETROLEUM  2              50.0  50.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  6        16.7     16.7     16.7  16.7  33.3 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  1        100.0                   
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  1                       100.0    
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  1                          100.0 
   CEREALS  1                       100.0    
   LABOR INTENSIVE  1              100.0             
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  1                       100.0    
   METALS                               
   MACHINERY  1                       100.0    
   CHEMICALS  5           20.0  60.0        20.0    
                                   
NIGERIA  28        3.6  3.6  7.1  7.1  3.6  35.7  39.3 
   PETROLEUM  1                 100.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  3        33.3        33.3        33.3 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  2                       100.0    
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  6                       50.0  50.0  
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   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  4                       25.0  75.0 
   CEREALS  5                    20.0  20.0  60.0 
   LABOR INTENSIVE                               
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  3           33.3           66.7    
   METALS                               
   MACHINERY  4              50.0        25.0  25.0 
   CHEMICALS                               
                                   
BANGLADESH  81           3.7  11.1  2.5  28.4  37.0  17.3 
   PETROLEUM                               
   RAW MATERIALS                               
   FOREST PRODUCTS  1                    100.0       
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  4                    50.0  25.0  25.0 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  9              22.2  11.1     33.3  33.3 
   CEREALS  16           6.3     6.3     50.0  37.5 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  27              7.4     51.9  37.0  3.7 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  18           5.6  11.1     27.8  38.9  16.7 
   METALS                               
   MACHINERY  4           25.0  25.0     25.0  25.0    
   CHEMICALS  2              100.0             
                                   
RWANDA  69  1.4  2.9  4.3  8.7  14.5  7.2  10.1  33.3  17.4 
   PETROLEUM  2              0.0  100.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  11              18.2     9.1  27.3  45.5 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  2        50.0     0.0        50.0    
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  6              16.7     16.7  33.3  33.3 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  11              9.1     9.1  54.5  27.3 
   CEREALS  7                    14.3  71.4  14.3 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  7        14.3  14.3  28.6        42.9    
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  4                    25.0  75.0    
   METALS  5           60.0  40.0             
   MACHINERY  7  14.3  14.3     14.3  14.3  28.6  14.3       
   CHEMICALS  7     14.3  14.3  14.3  14.3  14.3  14.3     14.3 
                                   
AUSTRALIA  140  2.9  5.0  6.4  10.7  18.6  7.1  7.1  22.9  19.3 
   PETROLEUM                               
   RAW MATERIALS  38     2.6  5.3  2.6  15.8  10.5  7.9  21.1  34.2 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  4     50.0     25.0  25.0             
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  12           8.3  8.3     16.7  50.0  16.7 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  28  7.1  3.6  7.1  3.6  28.6  3.6  3.6  25.0  17.9 
   CEREALS  27        11.1  14.8  11.1  11.1  11.1  18.5  22.2 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  5     20.0  20.0     40.0        20.0    
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  5           20.0  20.0     20.0  40.0     
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   METALS  5  20.0        40.0     20.0     20.0    
   MACHINERY  4        25.0  50.0  25.0             
   CHEMICALS  12  8.3  16.7     16.7  25.0  8.3     16.7  8.3 
                                   
CHILE  109  2.8  0.9  9.2  14.7  16.5  6.4  15.6  22.0  11.9 
   PETROLEUM                               
   RAW MATERIALS  18              5.6  11.1  11.1  33.3  38.9 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  20  5.0  5.0  20.0  25.0  10.0     15.0  15.0  5.0 
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  16           6.3  12.5     37.5  37.5  6.3 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  21  4.8     4.8  4.8  28.6  14.3     28.6  14.3 
   CEREALS  11        36.4  27.3  9.1  9.1  9.1  9.1    
   LABOR INTENSIVE  2              50.0     50.0       
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  4           25.0  25.0     50.0       
   METALS  3           33.3        33.3  33.3    
   MACHINERY                               
   CHEMICALS  14  7.1     7.1  28.6  28.6  7.1  7.1  7.1  7.1 
                                   
SAUDI ARABIA  56  3.6  10.7  14.3  12.5  19.6  10.7  8.9  10.7  8.9 
   PETROLEUM  7        28.6  14.3  28.6  28.6          
   RAW MATERIALS  8     25.0  25.0     12.5  12.5  12.5  12.5    
   FOREST PRODUCTS  2  50.0        50.0                
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  3              33.3     33.3  33.3    
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  6           33.3  16.7           50.0 
   CEREALS  3                    33.3  33.3  33.3 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  5        20.0     20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0    
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  5           20.0  20.0  20.0  0.0  40.0    
   METALS  3           33.3  33.3     33.3       
   MACHINERY  1                          100.0 
   CHEMICALS  13  7.7  30.8  23.1  7.7  23.1  7.7          
                                   
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES  61  1.6  3.3  13.1  14.8  18.0  8.2  14.8  13.1  13.1 
   PETROLEUM  3        33.3        66.7          
   RAW MATERIALS  9     11.1  22.2  11.1     11.1  22.2  11.1  11.1 
   FOREST PRODUCTS                               
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  3                    33.3     66.7 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  3        33.3              33.3  33.3 
   CEREALS  9                 11.1  33.3  33.3  22.2 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  8     12.5     25.0  50.0           12.5 
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  10           30.0  30.0     20.0  20.0    
   METALS  4           25.0  50.0     25.0       
   MACHINERY  7        42.9  14.3  14.3  14.3        14.3 
   CHEMICALS  5  20.0     20.0  20.0  20.0        20.0     
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IRELAND  86  11.6  12.8  24.4  10.5  11.6  8.1  4.7  9.3  7.0 
   PETROLEUM                               
   RAW MATERIALS  8     12.5        25.0  12.5     25.0  25.0 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  2  50.0        50.0                
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  6           16.7  33.3  16.7  33.3       
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  16  6.3  12.5  12.5  12.5  25.0  6.3  6.3  18.8    
   CEREALS  9           33.3  11.1        11.1  44.4 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  6     16.7  50.0     16.7        16.7    
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  2  50.0                 50.0       
   METALS  1           100.0                
   MACHINERY  15  13.3  13.3  53.3        20.0          
   CHEMICALS  21  23.8  23.8  38.1  4.8     4.8     4.8    
                                   
SINGAPORE  112  10.7  14.3  28.6  7.1  11.6  9.8  1.8  8.0  8.0 
   PETROLEUM  5  20.0     20.0     40.0  20.0          
   RAW MATERIALS  7                 14.3     14.3  71.4 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  1     100.0                      
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  5                    20.0  40.0  40.0 
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  5           20.0  20.0        60.0    
   CEREALS  5           20.0  0.0  20.0     40.0  20.0 
   LABOR INTENSIVE  12  8.3     41.7  16.7  25.0     8.3       
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  2              50.0        50.0    
   METALS                               
   MACHINERY  38  10.5  10.5  39.5  7.9  10.5  18.4        2.6 
   CHEMICALS  32  18.8  34.4  34.4  3.1  6.3  3.1          
                                   
FINLAND  172  26.7  14.0  13.4  16.3  11.0  2.3  7.6  6.4  2.3 
   PETROLEUM  1  100.0                         
   RAW MATERIALS  14     7.1  7.1     21.4  14.3  14.3  21.4  14.3 
   FOREST PRODUCTS  25  12.0  12.0  16.0  24.0  16.0     4.0  12.0  4.0 
  
TROPICAL 
AGRICULTURE  3              33.3     66.7       
   ANIMAL PRODUCTS  4  25.0  50.0        25.0             
   CEREALS  6  16.7  16.7  16.7  16.7  16.7     16.7       
   LABOR INTENSIVE  10  50.0     10.0  10.0  10.0     20.0       
   CAPITAL INTENSIVE  7  57.1        28.6        14.3       
   METALS  16  18.8        43.8  12.5     12.5  12.5    
   MACHINERY  61  31.1  18.0  23.0  13.1  6.6  1.6  1.6  3.3  1.6 
   CHEMICALS  25  36.0  24.0  8.0  12.0  8.0  4.0  4.0  4.0    
                                   
Note: The second column provides the total number of products exported with RCA and the disaggregation 
into the 11 Leamer categories. The rest of the columns provide the percentage of the number of products in 
each of the 9 cells in table 2. 
 